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The cleanest burning fossil fuel, today, is natural gas. While many businesses have gone global, it has remained an exception. An
impending challenge facing the industry, however, is the evolution of a cartel from the 5-year-old Gas Exporting Countries Forum. How
would this new organization inﬂuence the trade of gas globally? Does its existence imply a threat to the development of gas trade? The
paper reviews this fairly new organization within the context of the above questions. It is mainly a comparative study of the body in
relation to OPEC’s historical, political and economic development. Subsequently, the author proposes probable inﬂuence options
available to the Forum and the impending consequence of such actions on the market. The outcome of this study calls for further
analysis and research on new issues and questions of interest.
r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1.1. Background
Man’s overwhelming dependence on carbon fuels for his
energy needs makes the issue of their potential availability
a great concern.1 Fears of impending scarcity persist, as the
‘depletionists’ seem to have found an audience2 in the on-
going debate over ‘depletionism’ (considered groundless
and lacking in economic analysis3 by this author). The
nominal increase in crude oil price since 2004 has, however,
given credence to analysts’ assertion of change in market
dynamics. According to the Venezuelan Energy minister,
Rafael Ramirez, ‘‘the oil market has gone through a
deﬁnitive structural change’’.4 As demand patterns gradu-
ally respond to the changing prices, the need for ane front matter r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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04, p. 1, para 1).
over 22 years of peddling their argument of ‘Depletion-
is based on a ﬁxed stock of ‘conventional’ oil reserves;
le of Technology, Investment and the feedback loops
rkets. For more, on ‘Depletionism’, please see Stevens, P.
dley, R. (2004).
conomist, (2004, p. 2).alternative to oil has arisen. This is because some
consumers eventually migrate to alternative fuels rather
than remain at the mercy of oil prices.5
Natural Gas may become the chosen alternative
globally. It is a clean-burning fuel used to heat homes,
hospitals and schools; generate electricity and fuel indus-
tries—varying from plastics and petrochemicals to fertilizer
producers. As the bridge to hydrogen fuel cells, it is
powering many bus ﬂeets and reduces CO2 emissions by
over 70%.6 Given the higher rate of consumption,
international trade in gas has signiﬁcantly gained impor-
tance over the recent years.7 In India, for example, gas
consumption has reached about 8% of total primary
energy8 from a mere 4% in 2002.9 Analysts are optimistic
that gas ‘ywill have a far-reaching impact on the world
economy, bringing new opportunities and risks, new
interdependencies and geopolitical alignments’.10
Despite this optimism, growth in gas trade has been
constrained by the lack of a fully integrated global market.5Tomkins, R. (2005, p. 9, para 10).
6Peterson, J. (2005).
7L’Hegaret, et al. (2003, p. 1, ﬁrst para).
8Jung, N. (2003) ‘‘Natural Gas in India.’’ in Wybrew-Bond, I. and
Stern, J (Eds.) (2003).
9IEA, (2004c, p. 269, para 4).
10Yergin, D. and Stoppard, M. (2003, p. 103).
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relative to proven reserves and demand growth. Apart from
economic considerations, political risk is a major reason for
the low rate of investment in some countries. For instance,
Venezuelan gas has remained relatively unexploited compared
to its Trinidadian neighbour.11 Meanwhile, huge proven gas
reserves remain untapped in many other countries,12 like Iran,
which had over 27 tcm as at December 2004.13
Against this background the author evaluates two key
issues hinged on the economics, geopolitics and security of
natural gas supply14:1
1
1
1
1
In:
1The potentials of a gas cartel (like OPEC) emerging
from the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF)
formed 4 years ago as a meeting-point for major gas
producing countries.17Adelman, M.A. (1993, p. 417).The mechanisms through which the Forum (cartel) can
inﬂuence the emergence of a global gas market. The
analysis reﬂects the impact of each cartel action on gas
trade.
1.2. Relevance of study
The study is important, ﬁrst, because there are fears that
the Forum may become a major player in the Petroleum
Industry. It may replicate OPEC’s role in the global oil
(energy) market by inﬂuencing gas prices and security of
supply in the future. The work shows the extent to which
OPEC may serve as the Forum’s model, given that some
OPEC member-states have already joined.
The paper is pertinent because it cautions against the
prevalent complacency exhibited by scholars and especially
consumers (gas-importing nations) on this issue. Unfortu-
nately, most experts and market analysts, ‘‘who, in the 1970s,
could see no end to the sellers’ market, today can see no
prospect of a return to it’’.15 Third relevance is the likely
consequences of such a group on the world political economy:
what diplomatic and economic relations would result between
gas exporters and importers? Already, concerns do exist that
global gas supply may not match demand, as major
consuming nations become net-importers.16 Finally, this
work is important because the author considers the world
gas market today palpably different from that discussed in
many gas textbooks and articles published before 1990.
1.3. Methodology, scope and structure
The Paper shall be approached as a comparative
analysis. Comparisons are drawn mainly from OPEC and1Webb-Vidal, A. (2005, p. 11, para 7).
2Economist (2004).
3B.P. (2005).
4Subsequently, it is referred to as the Forum.
5Tucker, P.W. (1986) ‘‘The natural gas market: The cyclical process.’’
Stevens, P. (Ed.) (1986).
6Banerjee, N. (2004).other commodity cartels (sometimes). Emphasis shall be on
the formative stages of the Forum in relation to OPEC’s
evolution and modus operandi. The author appreciates
that no two cartels are the same but ‘they are all historical
individuals, who change overtime.’17Although, there is no
consensus among Economists on whether OPEC is a cartel
or not,18 this study would not delve into the ‘OPEC-Cartel
argument’.
A brief on the economic theory of collusion is presented
in Section 2 as part of the framework for analysis. Section 2
dwells mainly on the cartel question. Precisely, it captures
OPEC’s history and its role in the oil market as a basis for
analyzing the Forum within the gas industry. It looks
speciﬁcally at the history of OPEC in respect of its pricing
behaviour. The subsequent sub-sections explore the gas
industry in relation to the oil industry; the Forum’s history;
prospects and constraints of ‘cartelization’. The third
section presents the likely inﬂuence path of the Forum
with sound justiﬁcations for such likely actions. It
subsequently concludes the article by highlighting the
consequences of these actions on the evolving global gas
market.
2. GECF and the cartel question
Historically, keen efforts were made to cartelize several
internationally traded commodities like tin, coffee, cocoa,
tea, copper, diamond and oil. Some were unsuccessful
while others (uranium, bauxite and diamond) have enjoyed
varying degrees of success.19 In this sub-section, therefore,
the gas cartel question is covered in a comparative analysis.
2.1. Basis for analysing the forum
2.1.1. Economic theories of collusion20: an overview
This sub-section brieﬂy gives insight of what a cartel is
and also serves as a framework for evaluating the Forum.
Generally, a cartel is deﬁned as ‘‘a combination of
producers or sellers that join together to control a
product’s production or price.’’21 Therefore, a cartel may
be formed by various producers or sellers in the form of
private ﬁrms or governments or a mixture of both.22
Although other reasons may be adduced for collusion, the
economic consequences are basically similar to those of a
monopolistic industry.23 Because members have the
strategic option of either cheating or complying,24 cartels
are more fragile than monopoly, but also, more damaging
to society.2518Alhajji, A.F. and Huettner, D. (2000, p. 1152, para 4).
19Besanko, D., et al. (2004) example 6.4 on p. 213, last para.
20This relates only to Cartel Theory.
21Garner, B.A. (Ed.) (1999).
22Desta, M.G. (2003).
23Blair, R.D and Kaserman, D.L. (1985, p. 132, para 2).
24Parkin, M. (2000, p. 297, para 3).
25See Blair and Kaserman supra note 23 at p. 133, para 1.
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cartel can be deduced. A cartel inﬂuences the market by2
2
2
Ca
2
3
3
3Having a small number of sellers/producers with a
signiﬁcant share of the market. Deterring entry of new producers at the fringe by
various means. Controlling available capacity (supply) and capacity
expansion by assigning quotas to its members. Enforcing these quotas with the principal aim of
controlling price; maximizing revenue; and maintain-
ing/increasing market share.26
This theoretical outline would be applied in subsequent
discussions on OPEC and the Forum so as to understand
their behaviour.
2.1.2. OPEC
2.1.2.1. Brief history. The above perspective projects
OPEC as a cartel but it has lacked one major characteristic
or the other at various stages of its existence. This explains
why it has been variously described as the ‘Redundant’,
‘Effective’ or ‘Defected’ Cartel.27
A comprehensive and generally accepted exposition on
its nature and behaviour has remained illusive and
controversial among economists. The author, however,
considers the argument unnecessary within the scope of
this work, and therefore emphasizes OPEC’s ﬁscal, pricing
and production policies relevant to subsequent analysis.
Formation: The oil market before 1960 had two forms of
cartel arrangements that controlled either price, production
volume or both at different periods.
The ﬁrst was a group of vertically and horizontally
integrated IOCs. They included the Seven Sisters28 and
CFP.29 The second cartel arrangement was formed within
the US by individual state governments to ration produc-
tion quotas. Although domestic, their inﬂuence and impact
had consequences on the international oil market.30 These
two groups set the foundation—reason and structure—on
which OPEC was formed.
In September 1960, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
and Venezuela formed OPEC to restore oil price back to its
precut level (i.e. to defend crude oil price).31 OPEC’s
primary mission, among others, is to realize oil price
stability at a reasonable level and in fairness to both
producers and consumers. It, however, gives priority ‘‘at all
times to the interest of oil-producing nations and to the
necessity of securing a steady income for themy’’326See Alhajji supra note 18 at p. 1153, para 5.
7Claes D.H. (2001).
8They were Jersey (Exxon), Socony-Vacuum (Mobil), Standard of
lifornia (Chevron), Texaco, Gulf, Royal Dutch/Shell and B.P.
9Yergin D. (1991, p. 503, para 2).
0Danielsen, A.L. (1982).
1See Yergin supra note 29.
2OPEC at OPEC at http://www.opec.org.2.1.2.2. Oil market and OPEC pricing. The nature of the
oil market has ensured OPEC’s ability to regulate and
inﬂuence price. Historically, in the late 1970s there were
few spot market transactions and price determined rigidly
through OPEC’s announcements.33 These prices also
formed the basis for long-term contracts.
In the early 1980s, however, more Petroprenuers entered
the market as nationalization changed the structure of the
IOCs. Gradually the market became more transparent as
arms length transactions increased. The Spot market
expanded and more liquidity was created to manage
trading risk. Term contracts were then indexed to spot
prices. Hence, OPEC’s grip became weak as it attempted to
regain control after the second Oil shock.34
Thereafter, in 1982 OPEC introduced the quota
system for rationing production volumes. Its price-ﬁxing
powers were greatly destabilized after the introduction,
in March 1983, of NYMEX futures contract.35 Together
with the IPE Brent Futures, they served as instruments for
price-risk management. These derivatives are more sophis-
ticated now and are used to mobilize funds for oil projects.
Despite the effect of Saudi’s policy change on the market
(1986 oil price crash) OPEC still uses the quota system till
date.
In April 2000, OPEC nations signed the ‘gentlemen’s
agreement’ to maintain a range of prices within $22–28 per
barrel.36 The 2004 oil-price upsurge has raised new
questions on OPEC’s ability to manage oil prices. At
present, an interaction of OPEC supply manipulation and
market forces at the various oil Exchanges37 determine
crude oil prices.
The above history of OPEC shows that the organization
did not suddenly become relevant in the oil industry.
Starting from the Maadi Pact in Cairo April 1959 through
its actual formation on 14 September 1960,38 it underwent
an evolutionary process to become what it is today. Its
metamorphosis was enhanced by various political and
market factors; technological innovations; commitment
of some member-countries (like Saudi Arabia), and
strategic policy changes. Oil, also, did not become a
globally traded commodity suddenly, but rather developed
over time to become the most important energy market in
volume and global penetration.39 Within this context and
framework, the potentials of a gas cartel be considered
below.33Gately G. (1984, pp. 1101–1112).
34See Alhajji supra note 18.
35Ait-Laoussine, N. (2002).
36Economist (2000).
37These are the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX, http://
www.nymex.com), the International Petroleum Exchange in London (IPE,
http://www.ipe.uk.com) and the Singapore International Monetary
Exchange (SIMEX, http://www.simex.com.sg).
38See Claes supra note 27 at p. 61, para 1.
39Adelman, M.A. and Lynch, M.C. (2004, p. 809, para 1).
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This question is answered by analysing the history of the
Forum on the basis of the evolutionary trends of OPEC, as
well as, the oil and gas markets. Beginning with its history;
the constraints and prospects for collusion are subse-
quently explored.
2.2.1. History of GECF
Algeria tried, in the early 1980s, to create a Forum of gas
exporters. The US State Department, however, lobbied its
allies and the Algerian effort failed.40 Gas exporting
countries have created a Forum for their interest through
dialogue and sharing of information. They aim to build
more cooperation among gas producers and consumers.
The Forum had its inaugural session in May 2001 in
Tehran. In attendance were Algeria, Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Nigeria, Norway (as observer), Oman, Qatar,
Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan and Iran.
Algeria hosted the second session in February (1st and
2nd) 2002. At this meeting the Forum’s membership
expanded to include Bolivia, Egypt, Libya, and Venezue-
la.41
In September 2002 at Osaka, after a mini-summit, the
Forum declared its intention to contribute towards
‘‘ystable and transparent energy markets for the health
of the world economy, security of supply and demand, and
the expansion of the global trade in energy sources’’.42
In Doha, Qatar, on 4 February 2003, a third session of
the Forum was held.43 The Forum, which operates a rotary
presidency, held a Ministers Summit in March 2004 and
decided to establish an executive bureau.44 This was set-up
by the end of June 2004 and announced in Egypt during the
fourth (general) session in July 2004.45 Trinidad and
Tobago hosted the ﬁfth session of the Forum in April
2005. The sixth Ministerial Meeting has been scheduled to
hold in Venezuela on a date to be ﬁxed by the Executive
Bureau.46
At the session in Trinidad and Tobago, the Ministers
discussed and endorsed the General Framework and
Structure47of the Forum. Also agreed, was the establish-
ment of a Liaison Ofﬁce in Qatar to facilitate the affairs of
the Organization. The Liaison Ofﬁce is also expected to
conduct researches, maintain records of models and
ongoing studies, as well as, ensure exchange of information
among Member-countries.4840Davis, J.D. (1984, p. 264, para 3).
41CDA (2002).
42Global Gas Reporting (2003).
43Khelil C. (2003).
44Aberdeen Press, (2004, p. 24).
45PRAVDA RU. (2004).
46Ministry of Energy and Energy Industries, Trinidad and Tobago
(2005).
47This includes three operational levels: Ministerial Meeting; Executive
Bureau and Experts Meeting.
48See Ministry of Energy supra note 46.The Forum, among other objectives, intends to eliminate
constraints hindering global gas trade by designing uni-
form pricing rules for long-term contracts. The group also
aims to ‘co-ordinate their interests’ in the gas industry.49
Algeria was chosen, at the April Meeting, to spearhead the
development of a gas supply and demand model.50 The
model would be kept at the Liaison Ofﬁce for market
analysis.
Meanwhile, Egypt has already presented, to the execu-
tive bureau, a uniform pricing formula that would de-link
gas contract pricing from oil prices. Also expected is the
strategy for price ﬁxing over a period and subsequent
periodic review.51 The Egyptians claim the formula would
aid producers in planning ahead; save consumers from
price ﬂuctuations and ensure stable cash-ﬂows for banks’
project evaluation.52 When adopted it may be used
uniformly by members of the Forum53 and could result
in a transition from netback pricing.54 Against this
background, Qatar’s Deputy Premier has said that the
Forum does not intend to control gas prices by restricting
production.55
Does this mean that the Forum would ﬁx gas prices?
Initially OPEC used the method of announcing crude oil
prices in the 1970s.56 Would the Forum do the same now?
While the above questions are considered in the next
section, the Forum appears advantageously positioned to
learn from OPEC’s successes and failures.
2.2.2. Prospects
Like in OPEC, the Forum’s member-nations are united
by a common interest—their status as gas-producers and
the resultant motivation to maximize revenues from
exports. The following factors, also, enhance the potentials
for its transformation to a market-controlling cartel:
2.2.2.1. Russian factor. Russia is the world’s largest
producer of gas and has about 30% of global proven gas
reserve. Iran has 15% and Qatar 9%.57 The EU (including
the 10 new members) gets 40% of their gas imports from
the FSU. Speciﬁcally, some European Countries—Finland
and the Baltic States—rely solely on Russian gas.58 The
Russian OAO Gazprom also transports and sells Turkmen,
Kazakh and Uzbek gas resources.59 In partnership with
national gas companies in its target market, Gazprom has,
also created various downstream afﬁliates. Its incumbent49Associated Press (2005).
50See Ministry of Energy supra note 46.
51Devi, S. (2004).
52Energy Intelligence Group (2004).
53A source in the Egyptian Energy Ministry claims a Member-nation of
the Forum used the Price Formula in a recently signed contract.
54Please see author’s forthcoming paper on this issue ‘‘An examination
of LNG Pricing’’.
55See Aberdeen supra note 44.
56Grifﬁn (1982).
57IEA (2004b, p. 288, para 1).
58Perner, J. and Seeliger, A. (2003, p. 23, para 4).
59Nazarov (2004, p. 1, para 1).
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strategic and China and Japan are gradually competing for
gas supplies from Russia.60
Russia’s reserve size, market share and geographic
position are quite important considering the unstable and
hostile nature of some gas-rich countries like Iran61and
Saudi Arabia. It invariably creates the opportunity for
Russia to be either the price leader or swing-producer in
the Forum like Saudi Arabia is in OPEC. The inclusion of
Russia is very important to the transformation of the
Forum into a Cartel. Russia also attended the Forum’s
ﬁfth Session held on 26 April 2005 in Trinidad and
Tobago.62
These facts may not imply that an OGEC will emerge,
but they do, however, directly enhance the prospects. This
assertion is logical considering the political and economic
nature of energy-yielding commodities. At present, gas is a
geopolitical weapon used by Russia within the FSU.63
Sighting refusal to accept new prices and ‘‘lack of
payments,’’ as reasons, the Kremlin, via Gazprom, shut
off gas supplies to Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia
severally because of domestic or foreign policy differences
with these countries. Arguably, it appears the Kremlin has
‘‘decided that everyone not part of the Russian sphere will
have to pay market prices for gas’’64 Worth emphasizing,
however, is the fact that neither Russia nor the Kremlin
made any political demands on Ukraine during the recent
January 2006 gas row.65 It managed to mend ties with its
longtime regional rival, Turkey, and in 2001, Gazprom
linked Russia’s Stavropol region to the Turkish capital of
Ankara via the ‘‘Blue Stream’’ pipeline. Turkey is there-
fore, a major Russian gas client, while additional pipeline
plans with Armenia and Iran are also progressing. In
recognition of this, the strengthening of energy dialogue
with Russia, therefore, has remained a priority in the EU’s
foreign policy.66
2.2.2.2. Demand. It is projected that, between 2002 and
2030, global energy demand would expand by almost 60%.
Gas consumption, would also, increase by 90%. Then gas
share of total primary energy would increase to 25%.67
More than 40% of the incremental increase in global
energy consumption would be driven by power generation
demand.68 Power generation would, also, account for 59%
of the increase in gas demand.
The present and potential demand for gas is inducing the
oil majors to investment more in gas projects even without
fully securing sales contracts for the entire projects’60See Aberdeen supra note 44.
61See Webb-Vidal supra note 11.
62Coy, P. and Bush, J. (2005, p. 36).
63Agoulnik, A. (2004).
64Reynolds, P. (2006).
65Stern, J. (2006).
66Eubusiness (2005).
67See IEA supra note 57.
68Williams, B. (2003).volumes. Given demand, they intend to capture end-user
markets. It may be recalled that investments in multi-
billion dollar oil ﬁelds also developed in a similar pattern.
The resultant infrastructure and producing capacity later
enhanced OPEC’s nationalization policy and subsequently,
market power.
The emergence of a cartel in any commodity market is
predicated on the existence of sufﬁcient demand to enable
the cartel operate on the inelastic part of the market
demand curve. Whether the Forum would capitalize on the
demand situation at the appropriate developmental stage
of gas markets is, arguably, predictable.2.2.2.3. Reserve factor and market share. At the current
production rate, global proven reserves of gas (5501Tcm)
would last for 60 years compared to oil’s 40 years.69 The
Forum’s member-countries own 78.9% of global gas
reserves and contribute 55.6%70 of international gas
production as against OPEC’s 75% and 40%, respectively
for oil.71 Although gas is more dispersed regionally,
compared to oil, the overall distribution of gas reserves is
more concentrated. Hence, globally Iraq and Saudi Arabia
own 36% of proven oil reserves, while 45% of gas is owned
by Russia and Iran. Qatar has the world’s largest single gas
ﬁeld72 with a size that equals total oil reserves of all North
and South American countries.73
Despite overhauling oil steadily, gas proven reserves are
over two thirds of oil.74 Considering the above, the Forum
may exercise more inﬂuence in the market than OPEC does
at present if it becomes a cartel. A cartel’s ability to impact
on the market situation actually depends on its spare
capacity and cost variable (mainly). These variables,75
however, also depend on the reserve size and reserve factor.
Speciﬁcally, the costs of exploration and exploitation are
inversely related to the reserve size and reserve factor.2.2.2.4. Policy inclination. The Forum is made up of
OPEC member nations76 and other gas producing coun-
tries.77 Coincidentally, 50% of proven gas reserves are in
developing countries,78 and most of the Forum’s member-
countries fall into this category. Many (if not all) of them
rely on natural resources as the main revenue earner (like in
OPEC).79 Hence, the desire to continually maximize
beneﬁts from economic rent seems a common objective
like in OPEC.See BP supra note 13.
71OPEC at OPEC at http://www.opec.org/homepage/frame.
72The giant North Field has over 25, 770 bcm or 164bn barrels of oil.
73Abi-Aad, N. (2005, p. 19, para 2).
74Tempest P. in Conant M.A. (Ed.) (1986).
75Spare capacity and cost.
76They include Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar and
Venezuela.
77Rahman, M. (2004).
78See Tempest supra note 74.
79See Alhajji supra note 18 at p. 1157, para 3.
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revenue needs, they all face the problem of limited
infrastructure.80 Inadequate transport facilities can be
overcome through the use of asset swaps between two or
more exporters. For example, in 1999, Trinidad exported
1.3 bcm of LNG to the US and 0.75bcm to Spain.
Similarly, Qatar exported 0.60bcm of LNG to the US
and 0.84bcm to Spain.81 Using asset swap, some shipping
capacity would have been created if Trinidad had supplied
the total volume for US market and Qatar the Spanish
market. They would have also saved signiﬁcant shipping
cost and freed up shipping capacity for uncommitted gas
trade.
These common problems and interests are quite funda-
mental and strategic for gas-producers to agree on. It,
therefore, becomes easier to formulate and direct policies
for the mutual beneﬁt of members under a cartel situation.
Within this context though, they differ with regard to gas
production capabilities, reserves size, the role of gas in their
economies, and the markets they sell into. This diversity of
interests and motivations may sometimes create the
potential for conﬂicting interests, as has been seen over
the years in the oil markets with OPEC.82
2.2.2.5. Technological advancement and increased appliance
stock. Technological innovation is contributing to the
reduction in exploration, production and transportation
costs. Essentially, as an energy-source becomes relatively
cheaper, at a certain price level and ﬁxed appliance stock,
its industry demand curve becomes inelastic.83 Therefore,
as the stock of gas-using appliances (for electricity,
manufacturing, heating and transportation) increases its
demand would become price inelastic.84
There are projections that gas consumption would
exceed coal within the next 5 years.85 CCGT and CHP
would contribute most to the increase in gas-using
appliance stock, considering its low capital costs, construc-
tion lead-time and low economies of scale.86 Combined
heat and power plants87 are becoming the trend especially
in Western Europe.88 In Cairo, fuelling stations are
springing up to serve motorists with compressed natural
gas (CNG)89. These developments would, obviously, give
gas-producers leverage to manipulate price. Recall that the
United States’ increased demand for oil in the 1950s and
1960s pump-primed the industry to its greatest heights-80Okogu, B.E. (2005, p. 20, para 3).
81Okogu, B.E. (2005, p. 21, para 2).
82Datamonitor (undated).
83See Danielsen supra note 30.
84This would hold only in the short and medium terms.
85IEA (2002b, p. 117, last para).
86See IEA supra note 57.
87These plants are mostly gas-ﬁred. They use waste heat for further
industrial processes or space heating with over 70% efﬁciency.
88See Abi-Aad supra note 73 at p. 17, para 5.
89PM Communications, p. 2, para 1, at PM Communications, p. 2, para
1, at http://www.pmcomm.com/globalgas/introduction.htm.’Good Old Days’.90 This, subsequently, indirectly though,
contributed to the emergence of OPEC.
When the Forum’s costs become lower through better
technology relatively, it can reduce price enough to create
inelastic demand for its gas. Low cost is a vital advantage
that Middle East OPEC member-nations enjoy. The rate of
technological developments in the use of gas would likely
increase, as was the case between 1900 and 1950 for oil.91
2.2.2.6. Quota system. Unlike OPEC, historically, com-
modity cartels ﬁx production/sales quotas for their members
from inception.92 Like the infant OPEC, the Forum is yet to
ﬁx quotas for its members but rather aims to promote market
stability, transparency and security of supply. If supply
security is the prime interest of gas-importing countries, what
might the key interest of gas-producing nations be?
The Forum’s objective implies increasing revenue. This
may be achieved simply through a high price regime. It may
also be achieved through the extensive development of an
organized sellers’ market and a relatively stable price.
Clearly, market development and price stability is propelling
gas investments, as well as, demand. Gas importing countries
can not continue to swallow the Forum’s claims in the face of
all this evidence. It is similar to the American’s belief of the
Saudi’s oil supply assurances. These myths are ‘‘part of a
larger myth that the world is running out of oil’’.93
2.2.3. Possible constraints to ‘cartelization
Despite the above prospects, the following constraints
can signiﬁcantly restrain the Forum from attempting to
control the market:
2.2.3.1. Concentration of membership. This implies the
number of gas-producing nations in the Forum. The higher
the number, the more difﬁcult it would be to agree on a
policy issues. Similarly, information ﬂow, policy co-
ordination and interest reconciliation would be complex
and time consuming. This is, especially so, because their
gas industries (and markets) are at different levels of
development. Such divergence in circumstances would
affect policy-making. This issue is, unfortunately, compli-
cated by the scattered distribution of proven gas reserves
around the world94 as is evident in Table 1 below.
It is worth emphasizing, however, that OPEC has almost
the same number of member-countries as the Forum. OPEC
had ﬁve95 founding member-countries96 but the number later
increased, over the years, to 13.97 Despite the reduction in90De Vany A.S. and Walls D.W. (1995).
91See Tempest supra note 74.
92See Alhajji supra note 18, Section 3.1; p. 1153.
93Adelman, M.A. (2004, p. 21, last para).
94SPE Int’l (2004a).
95They were Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.
96OPEC (2002).
97The eight new entrants were Qatar in 1961; Indonesia and Libya in
1962; UAE (formerly Abu Dhabi) in 1967; Algeria in 1969; Nigeria in
1971; Ecuador (1973–92) and Angola (1975–94).
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Table 1
Proven reserves of natural gas and 2004 production for the GECF
Countries Proved Reserves R/P ratio Gas productiona 2004
End 2004 (Tcm) Share of total (%) 2004 (Bcm) Change 2004 over 2003 (%) Share of total (%)
Bolivia 0.89 0.5 b 8.5 49.6 0.3
Trinidad & Tobago 0.53 0.3 19.2 27.7 12.0 1.0
Venezuela 4.22 2.4 b 28.1 11.5 1.0
Russian Federation 48.00 26.7 81.5 589.1 1.8 21.9
Turkmenistan 2.90 1.6 53.1 54.6 0.9 2.0
Iran 27.50 15.3 b 85.5 4.9 3.2
Oman 1.00 0.6 56.5 17.6 6.7 0.7
Qatar 25.78 14.4 b 39.2 24.8 1.5
Algeria 4.55 2.5 55.4 82.0 1.0 3.0
Egypt 1.85 1.0 69.1 26.8 7.5 1.0
Libya 1.49 0.8 b 7.0 9.3 0.3
Nigeria 5.00 2.8 b 20.6 7.3 0.8
Brunei 0.34 0.2 28.3 12.1 2.0 0.4
Indonesia 2.56 1.4 34.9 73.3 0.7 2.7
Malaysia 2.46 1.4 45.7 53.3 4.0 2.0
Forum’s 129.07 71.9 1126.0 41.8
Total world 179.53 100.0 66.7 2691.6 2.8 100.0
Of which: EU 25 2.75 1.5 12.8 215.2 1.6 8.0
OECD 15.02 8.4% 13.7 1098.6 0.4 40.8
FSU 58.51 32.6% 78.9 741.3 2.5 27.5
Notes: Proved reserves of natural gas—Generally taken to be those quantities that geological and engineering information indicates with reasonable
certainty can be recovered in the future from known reservoirs under existing economic and operating conditions.
Reserves/Production (R/P) ratio—If the reserves remaining at the end of any year are divided by the production in that year, the result is the length of
time that those remaining reserves would last if production were to continue at that level.
Source of data: BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy 2005.
aExcluding gas ﬂared or recycled.
bOver 100 years.
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Ecuador, arguments, problems and divergent interests have
remained over the years.98 The Forum, on the other hand,
started with 11 member-countries but its membership was
also increased to 15 at the third session. Actually, only 11
member-countries and two observer-nations attended its last
session in April 2005.99 More important is the fact that any
decision/policy agreed upon, by a relatively large number of
members, would be stronger and more effective in the market.
2.2.3.2. Political risks and high capital costs. High capital
costs along the supply chain continue to constrain gas as an
energy source despite the increased number of LNG
projects.100 Most gas-rich countries lack the huge capital
investments needed for developing their gas reserves. This
situation is further compounded by the inability of volatile
and unstable countries to attract foreign investors. For
instance, Venezuelan gas has remained relatively un-
exploited compared to its Trinidadian neighbour.101 Unlike
Qatar, Iran is yet to develop its proposed LNG project.10298See Datamonitor supra note 82.
99See Ministry of Energy supra note 46 at para 1.
100Jensen, J.T. (2003, p. 34, para 3).
101Webb-Vidal, A. When life, and not just carnival, is a gas, p. 11, para 7,
of F.T., 26 January 2005.
102The US has been discouraging International investments in Iran’s
Energy Sector over the latter’s nuclear enrichment programme. Venezue-These countries also lack developed ﬁnancial markets to
fund their projects. In the case of OPEC, the oil industry
had developed a lot before it was established. Political risk
considerations have dampened investors’ zeal, despite the
high costs and huge capital requirement. Balancing this
risk against expected proﬁts is difﬁcult due to changing
ﬁscal circumstances. Unfortunately, however, governments
perceive companies’ proﬁt from natural resources as cost103
in the computation of revenue from natural resources.
These obstacles have hampered expansion in their produc-
tion capacities and market share. It may, indirectly restrain
the Forum’s ability to collude in a cartel form.
2.2.3.3. Lack of spare capacity. Spare capacity is the
difference between actual production and production
capacity.104 As a function of production cost and reserve
size, spare capacity is another key factor that determines
producers’ ability to control the oil market. Given its huge
proven reserve and low production cost, Saudi Arabia has
the highest amount of spare capacity in OPEC.105 Hence, it
plays the important role of swing-producer in OPEC. The(footnote continued)
la’s leftist government in Latin America is increasingly raising concerns
among IOCs, UK and the US.
103Johnston, D. (1994, p. 5).
104See Alhajji supra note18.
105See Danielsen supra note 30.
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capacity due the cost issues mentioned above.
There is also the concern that Russia may opt out of the
Forum and attempt to run alone. Russia can capitalize on
her market share for self-beneﬁt rather than collude with
other countries. The LNG revolution has already presented
Qatar as the swing-supplier of LNG in Northeast Asia and
the Atlantic Basin. Hence, it may become an alternative to
Russia. However, uncommitted re-gasiﬁcation capacity is
required for increased LNG trade globally and third party
access is yet an obligation in many countries.106
This capacity constraint may be overcome if the Forum
adopts Egypt’s proposed uniform pricing formula.107 This
is, especially so, because a swing-producer is not particu-
larly relevant in a horizontal price-ﬁxing cartel. Rather, the
least cost producer can be the price-leader. More impor-
tantly, spare capacity may not be a vital condition for gas
producers to exert control over trade.
2.2.3.4. Information. Information is a key element for the
establishment and sustenance of market control by a
cartel.108 In a bid to increase their revenue and market
share, many OPEC member-countries cheat by producing
more than their quota.109 Inadequate and incorrect
information have created the opportunity for cheating
and OPEC is still unable to detect or deter cheating.110 The
lack of information may hinder the Forum from determin-
ing price or supply in the market. Effective control of the
market requires sharing of and access to information on
prices, new technology, costs and production levels in each
market (or country).
This explains the Forum’s effort towards setting up a
simulation scheme. The scheme is expected to acquire and
analyse market information at both regional and global
levels for a better understanding of the industry.111 The
establishment of a Liaison Ofﬁce in Qatar to speciﬁcally
handle information indicates the Forum’s appreciation of
this concern.
Problems of information availability and transparency,
however, are not peculiar to the Forum or gas markets.
The entire energy industry is plagued by the unavailability
and inaccuracy of oil and gas data. Unfortunately, issues of
data and statistics inﬂuence not just prices and markets but
also international politics. This explains the pioneering and
development of the Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI) by the
International Energy Forum and six other organizations—
APEC, Eurostat, IEA, OLADE, OPEC and the UN—in
January 2005.112106Mazighi, A. (2003, p. 323, para 5).
107Discussed in Section 2.2.1, on p. 8.
108See Alhajji supra note 18.
109See Besanko supra note 19 at para 3.
110Mabro R. (1999).
111See Khelil supra note 43.
112Walther, A. (2005, p. 21).2.2.3.5. Competition and price issues. This constraint
relates to competition from other sources of energy. As
the demand for gas increases, keen competition from oil
and other renewable energy sources will persist.113 Con-
sidering the availability of alternatives, especially nuclear
and coal, gas-rich countries would be cautious about
turning the Forum into a cartel.
The lack of a reference price and global market for gas
also highlights the need for such caution. This has also
hindered funding from banks for gas projects because cash-
ﬂows are indexed to crude oil prices. Therefore, the Forum
will rather hold back until gas becomes the main energy
commodity globally.
2.2.3.6. International or regional cooperation. In strategic
response to a gas cartel threat, gas-importing countries
may opt for multilateral trade association or agreement to
forestall any disruptive action. For example, the EU or
WTO.
The author, however, doubts the effectiveness of the
WTO, International Energy Forum or any other interna-
tional cooperation/organization. Generally, the formation
of intergovernmental cartels is not illegal under the WTO.
Speciﬁcally, GATT Article XX(g), in respect of ‘‘trade-
restrictive measures for the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources,’’114 potentially permits OPEC’s supply
restriction.115 This further explains the inability of OECD’s
IEA and the WTO to restrain OPEC’s antics. Rather the
IEA and the US recently reafﬁrmed their cooperation with
OPEC even though the cooperating cartel members ‘‘were
and are committed to nothing’’.116
Despite the above prospects and constraints, the Forum
appears signiﬁcantly similar to infant OPEC. In the 1960s,
the oil majors attached little importance to OPEC,
pretending it did not exist, while Western governments
paid little attention.117 Although the study reveals some
reasonable obstacles to the emergence of a gas cartel, the
author does not consider it unlikely. On the contrary, the
fact still remains that there are great potentials for
cooperation by gas-rich countries.
At the moment, the Forum seems a gathering of
gas producers for the purpose of consultations to im-
prove the commodity’s potentials as an energy source.
Political and economic considerations may generate
new issues, but its form as a future cartel seems clearer
with some amount of precision. This assertion and the
group’s likely inﬂuence path are buttressed in the next
section.113See IEA supra note 57.
114See Desta supra note 22.
115Desta’s article, referenced above, attempts to reconcile the underlying
economic philosophy and geo-politics of the WTO and OPEC.
116See Adelman supra note 93.
117See Yergin supra note 29 at p. 523, para 4.
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Analyzing the Forum in the light of OPEC and Table 1
above, the following conclusions can be reached:
A membership of 15118 gas-producing countries is small
relative to their market share and proven reserve size of
over 71%. Second, for exhaustible commodities,119 capa-
city expansion and entry by new producers at the fringe are
naturally constrained by reserve availability, location of
gas,120 long lead-time and huge capital cost. For example,
capacity expansion in North America is already sticky
without the Forum deterring entry. Cartel inﬂuence and
market power, on the other hand, increases as production
by producers at the fringe peaks. Finally, the essence of
assigning and enforcing quotas is price regulation/determi-
nation. This means that if a cartel can ﬁx and regulate price
directly or indirectly then it can greatly inﬂuence the
development of the market.
3.1. Cartel influence mechanisms
Generally, natural gas (especially LNG) trade involves
‘‘obtaining the most gas possible for producers and
obtaining the most reasonable prices for consumers’’.121
It may, therefore, be said to obey the logic of security
because majority of gas transactions are based on long-
term contracts. As the market evolves gradually to obey the
logic of opportunity and arbitrage, how would the Forum
act to create a supplier’s market? The following are
possible inﬂuence paths available to the Forum:
3.2. Price mechanism
The price of gas has remained a central issue since its
emergence as an important energy source. Whether gas is
for domestic or international trade, the primary issues of
price, politics and proﬁtability are deeply intertwined.122
The evolution123 of gas pricing systems shows that
importing countries are continually trying to control
natural gas prices. A clear distinction between the
commodity and project supply markets for gas is empha-
sized below for a better understanding of subsequent
issues.
Commodity supply market for gas has many buyers,
sellers and transactions. Here, prices are determined
through the interplay of demand and supply forces on
the basis of gas-to-gas competition. Transactions, there-
fore, may involve Local distribution Companies (LDCs);
marketers (also called ‘aggregators’); domestic or industrial
consumers, pipeline and storage companies. The nature of
such transactions may also vary from spot deals to futures118This includes Russia as the 15th nation.
119Like oil and gas.
120See Claes supra note 27 at p. 43, para 3.
121See Mazighi supra note 106 at p. 321, para 4.
122Khan, A.R. (1986) in Mabro, R. (Ed.) (1986, p. 142, para 2).
123The history of Gas pricing systems is outside the scope of this paper.trade. Prices in the commodity supply market are inter-
related with those in the project supply market.
Project supply market for gas, on the other hand,
involves few buyers, sellers and transactions. It may also be
referred to as the upstream or investment market for gas.
Gas prices, in this market, are a function of alternative or
related fuels (usually oil) on the basis of an indexation
mechanism. Due to the huge capital involvement, long lead
time and other complexities, transactions are mainly on
long-term contracts. Only the big players, like the IOCs,
electricity generators; wholesale gas suppliers/distributors
and national oil/gas companies, participate in this market.
Gas prices and pricing policies in this market directly and
indirectly determine the revenues and dividends accruable
to producing countries. They are, therefore, subject of
subsequent reference and analysis in this sub-section. The
gas pricing policy was designed to favour industries in the
consuming countries. The beneﬁting industries, mentioned
above, include both the Local Distribution Companies
(LDCs) and the industrial end-users. In effect, the
producing countries were and still are ‘‘indirectly subsidiz-
ing these industries’’.124
A formal price-ﬁxing agreement used to maximize
industry proﬁt is called a cartel. In other words, the
signatories or ‘‘the conspirators operate at the same level
and would be rivals in the absence of an agreement’’.125
Price increases in existing gas contracts are triggered by
higher prices in new contracts. Simultaneously, the higher
prices lead to further exploration and production.126 It
follows, therefore, that an available option through which
the Forum can exert its inﬂuence on the market is the
instrument of price. By applying its model contract pricing
system, the Forum may be able to unify gas pricing,
upstream in the regional markets.
This paper posits that the Forum may begin by ﬁxing gas
contract prices with Russia leading the pack. That is,
focusing on the preferred and generally accepted price
rather than quantity (production) control. Such a cartel
would establish the price, while consumers determine
quantity through the market.127 Once the Forum can
determine a reasonable revenue-generating price, using the
expected Demand–Supply model, then equilibrium is
assumed.
Market statistical evidence reveals that gas prices are
generally more volatile than oil price is high.128 A major
reason for this is the lack of a uniﬁed pricing policy for gas
globally.129 Although this situation is unfavourable to both
producers and consumers, producers perceive that it
provides unfair revenue from their gas. Therefore, this
provides the Forum with a rational and logical reason for
taking action to unify and stabilize gas prices. This124Messili, A. (1986, p. 119, para 5).
125See Blair and Kaserman supra note 23 at footnote 1.
126MacAvoy P.W. (2000, p. 35).
127See Danielsen supra note 30.
128Mazighi A.E. (2004, p. 233, para 2).
129See Khan supra note 122 at p. 154, para 3.
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groups to maintain a minimum price level above which
prices are allowed to ﬂuctuate.130
Alternatively, basic market principles, like asset swaps
among exporters (mentioned earlier), may contribute
immensely towards unifying regional prices. Considering
the increasing ﬂow of information among member-
countries, asset swap would:1
1
of
1
Ga
lastCreate surplus shipping and trade volumes for the open
market. Consequently, enable producers to take advantage of
price development in other regions. Also result in price convergence across regions, as well
as, make sales contracts more efﬁcient and transparent
to reﬂect market development.The foregoing portends a price-ﬁxing cartel and price
leadership. The Forum’s effort to develop a Demand–Sup-
ply Model gives credence to the above assertion of an
emerging price-ﬁxing cartel. At present, the regional
markets combined with LNG trade competitively interact
to achieve an equilibrium131 price for gas. This mechanism
may be easier to regulate than the production quota system
operated by OPEC, if the expected demand-forecasting
model proves reliable.
Based on the trading performance of the Forum’s
Member-countries, as well as, evidence from existing
cartels, this pattern of behaviour would not reduce supplies
to the various markets. Essentially, in this scenario, supply
is not deliberately threatened since trade is mutually, but
inequitably, beneﬁcial to all parties. Rather, such an action
might well result in higher prices in gas markets. The
implications, for gas exploration and production, of higher
gas prices are negative and positive, respectively. Demand
shall drop slightly, while production would rise drastically,
depleting the proven reserves.132 Prices in other energy
markets may also become more volatile considering the
relative nature of prices. Consequently the development of
gas markets shall be stiﬂed by the imbalance resulting from
the introduction of a non-competitive pricing model. On
the other hand, the use of assets swaps and other market
principles would enhance growth in gas trade globally.
These conclusions are hinged on the inaccuracy of most
demand forecasting models. The effective utilization of
models is constrained by inadequate data; human errors
and the inability of such models to correctly predict human
behaviour. Any gas price-determination, fraught with the
above inadequacies, would certainly disrupt gas trade by
hampering stable and efﬁcient pricing.30See Alhajji supra note 18 at p. 1155, para 2.
31The market sets the price peculiar to each region based on the value
gas and relative to other substitutes.
32Mabro, R. (1986) The prospects for International Trade in Natural
s. In Mabro, R. (Ed.) Natural Gas: an International Perspective, p. 14,
para. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford.3.3. Contract influence mechanism
Contracts in the form of SPA, Charter Party and
Futures would remain an inherent part of the gas industry
globally. How they are used, and what for, would
invariably determine the future of gas globally.
Gas restructuring in the US was achieved mainly by
regulatory intervention in existing contracts between
buyers and sellers. Speciﬁcally, the US ‘‘FERC Order 380
relieved buyers of their minimum bill obligations’’133 and
enabled retailers (sellers) to shop for low cost gas among
suppliers. Due to the complicated nature of restructuring
the gas industry internationally, the Canadian gas market
was affected directly by the US contract intervention. The
action, however, provided excuse for US buyers to walk
away from uncompetitive (previously agreed) Canadian
contracts.134
The EU Directive in respect of ‘Destination Restriction
Clauses’ also had similar effect. It was actually a serious
issue of dispute between the EU and major suppliers135
(especially Gazprom and Sonatrach).136 The Directive did
not only result in contracts modiﬁcation and cancellation,
but the Nigerian and Norwegian LNG producers were
forced into denouncing the clauses. Gas producing
countries actually perceived it as aggressive and concluded
it was an ‘‘unjustiﬁed interference in established commer-
cial arrangements’’.137
Deregulation (restructuring), in North America and the
EU, was effected when gas was surplus in both regions. It
was, therefore, easier to ﬁnd willing suppliers competing
for market share or outlet after the contracts were broken.
Market power was the key weapon capitalized upon by the
governments in both regions.
The above historical preview clearly shows that the
GECF can also intervene in existing long-term gas sales
contract under the right market conditions. Going by the
various demand and supply projections (impending short-
age) in the importing countries, contract terms may be
modiﬁed or broken through unanimous/uniﬁed interven-
tion by the Forum (or its Member-countries). The modulus
operandi of the GECF may not be entirely similar to the
US or Europe but basically through direct intervention or
indirect interference. The Member-nations may indepen-
dently, simultaneously or unanimously alter the ‘negotiated
price’138 in all SPAs. The essential precondition would be
an existing or impending shortage that makes it easier to
ﬁnd willing buyers competing for available supplies.
Arguably, members of the Forum could try to reintro-
duce destination restriction clauses in gas contracts. This is
because market ﬂexibility through deregulated contracts133Jensen, J.T. (2004, p. 21, para 1).
134See Jensen supra note 133 at p. 22, para 1.
135Aissaoui, A. (2002).
136See Jensen supra note 133 at p. 22, para 2.
137Stern, J. (2002), p. 21, para 1.
138This is the Supplier–Buyer agreed reference price level, subject to
renegotiation periodically and used in the indexation mechanism.
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which they aim to reduce (or prevent) This difﬁcult (if
not impossible) option, however, seems to have been
overtaken by the creation of Proﬁt Sharing Mechanisms
which enable Sellers and Buyers to split margins resulting
from the diversion of cargoes and spot deals. Although
some experts have argued that the reduction in proﬁts is
only the ‘initial’ impact of gas-to-gas competition,139 this
author considers it only a partial analysis. This is because
the migration of value (and/or proﬁt) downstream, along
the gas chain, in most liberalized markets is a fundamental
change in gas markets that is bound to continue. The
strategies140 and efforts of the IOCs to integrate down-
wards by building/acquiring re-gasiﬁcation plants and/or
transmission capacity141 are clear indications of this fact.
Recent studies reveal that in Europe, production and
wholesale margins would fall by more than 20% while
retail margins would double within the next 5 years.142 The
fact that long-term contracts, which the Forum tried to
preserve,143 would dominate gas trade in the foreseeable
future seems to reinforce this assertion. This explains their
initial resistance towards liberalization because they
perceive it could further complicate development of new
gas projects without long-term contracts.144 Despite the
above negative impacts on gas-producers, however, in-
creased spot trading and arbitrage created by competition
are key determinants of price convergence and market
integration.
Such a retaliatory action seems realistic in the light of the
Forum’s initial effort to inhibit the EU on the ‘Destination
Clauses’. In February 2002, the Algerian Minister of
Energy expressed their discontent, during a meeting, in the
following words: ‘‘When they (European Institutions)
passed their legislation, they never consulted us. They
never thought of talking to the gas-exporting countries
before passing their laws’’.145 It may be recalled that,
‘‘indeed, OPEC was a response to an effort by a cartel of oil
buyers to suppress prices’’.146 Then, similarly, there was an
overwhelming surplus in the global oil market; the
producing nations were competing for market share and
they depended on the oil majors.147 History, incredibly, is
repeating itself because many ‘‘ypeople see no end in sight
to the current buyers’ market. Just as before, they will be
wrong’’.148
Any attempt, by the Forum, to disrupt the nature of gas
contracts may not augur well for the development of global139See Stern supra note 137 at p. 20, para 5.
140Shook, B. and Jaffe, A. (2001).
141Energy Information Administration (2004).
142Thomlinson, D. et al. (2004).
143See PM Communications supra note 89 at p. 2, para 6.
144See Stern supra note 137 at p. 20, last paragraph.
145‘‘Algeria: forum of gas exporting countries ends’’ BBC Monitoring
Service, 2 February 2002, quoted in Stern supra note 137 at p. 20, para 4.
146See Besanko supra note 19 at p. 213, example 6.4, para 1.
147See Yergin supra note 29 at p. 523, last sentence.
148See Tucker supra note 15 at p. 5, para 1.gas trade. Such collusive action, by the Forum, would
create an oligopolistic gas industry devoid of free-market
competition. The consequent interplay of geopolitics and
economic diplomacy resulting there from would also
produce other unfathomable inﬂuence on gas trade
globally. It may be recalled that, the EEC actually
suggested the formation of a European LNG importers’
coalition149 as a pre-emptive move against producers.
These political issues may culminate in the inevitable
‘demise’ of a striving energy resource industry.
3.4. Fiscal influence mechanism
Fiscal policies of both energy-importing and energy-
exporting countries affect energy markets directly or
indirectly. Basically, changes in the ﬁscal policies of gas-
producing countries create signiﬁcant effect on the cycle of
gas markets. Immediately gas price increase signals more
production, producing countries’ governments do not
hesitate to demand for more economic rent from these
activities.
This follows from the fact that gas price contains a user
cost and some element of rent. Commonly associated with
natural resources, the user cost reﬂects compensation for
gas produced today that cannot be produced tomorrow.
The rent is mainly the difference between the product price
and its marginal cost of production. The non-competitive
bidding process for gas contracts tends to give buyers a
negotiation margin. The comfort created by the rent and
user cost favour importers who bid a lower price for
contracts.150 For how long would the buyer’s market use
these elements of economic rent 151 for bargaining?
The Forum may inﬂuence gas trade globally by
unanimously imposing a tax rate/value payable by
importers, across the board on exports, to determine price.
It may be a direct explicit tax (like royalty: $2.00152) per
thousand cubic feet. Such a ﬂat tax rate/value would be
effective within the framework of renegotiable long-term
contracts. A tenable reason to justify such an action is the
earlier mentioned change in the value (margin) point along
the gas chain from upstream to downstream.
Generally, the tightening ﬁscal terms ‘‘seem more likely
to accentuate and perpetuate the downward part of the
(gas market) cycle’’.153 Despite this fact, member-states of
the Forum shall capitalize on obsolescence bargain to
squeeze gas-producing companies. This inﬂuence mechan-
ism should not be perceived as unrealistic but rather an
opportunity to maximize revenue from a natural resource.
It should be emphasized that an underling aim of the149See Messili supra note 124, p. 121, para 3.
150See Okogu supra note 80 at p. 20, para 1.
151Economic rent here is broken up into rent and user cost for the
purpose of analysis. In principle, they may be summed up to mean
economic rent.
152The Energy Modeling Forum at Stanford University is using $1.00 in
their Preliminary EMF 23 (Gas Cartel) Scenario Design.
153See Tucker supra note 15 at p. 6, para 3.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
O.N. Wagbara / Energy Policy 35 (2007) 1224–1237 1235Forum is to beneﬁt optimally from their natural resource
through the development of the gas sector. Given
improvement in gas technologies, development of markets,
and the subsequent vulnerability of the Multi-National
Enterprises (MNEs),154 the above becomes an option.
Furthermore, there seems to be unlimited scope for energy
resource-rich governments to inﬂuence economic affairs
through ﬁscal intervention.155
Ultimately, any action taken by the Forum in an attempt
to control the market would reduce investor conﬁdence,
increase political risk, mar diplomatic relations, and
disrupt gas trade (demand and supply) globally. The
subsequent multiplier effect of these on the global economy
is outside the scope of this paper.
4. Conclusion
Gas is now appreciated for its premium qualities rather
than being ﬂared as a nuisance fuel. There clearly exists
technology to unite demand with gas resources thousands
of miles away. As the gas industry surmounts cost
constraints, a new challenge and form of instability as
arisen. Today, gas trade is gradually becoming ‘‘the
hostage of geopolitics in generalyand superpower rivalries
in particular’’.156
Is a gas cartel likely?
In 2003, Yergin and Stoppard asserted: ‘‘an association
of some kind among LNG exporters is likely’’.157 That
association now exists and is called the Gas Exporting
Countries Forum. The Forum, however, does not exist
solely for the purpose of consultation with other industry
players. Thorough appraisal of the potentials for its
transformation into a cartel was presented. There are
sufﬁcient reasons that portend an emerging gas cartel
despite prevalent militating constraints. The result seems to
favour collusion by member-countries of the Forum, while
the constraints basically portray a limit to how far they can
go (at least for now). A gas cartel is foreseeable although its
market power in the short-term may be minimal. 41% of
respondents who attended an RBC Capital sponsored
energy conference in Houston attested to this.158 The
reality of the Forum turning a gas cartel should not be
assumed or wished away because ‘‘real markets seldom
behave ideally’’.159
Relative to OPEC’s evolutionary trend, the Forum is
practically making efforts to understand the realities and
peculiarities of the gas market for the beneﬁt of the
industry and its members. Egypt’s effort may create the
opportunity for the Forum to dictate future prices, even
though no international market for gas exists. Disguised at
present, the Forum intends to inﬂuence the market and154Genc Mehmet (2005).
155See Abi-Aad supra note 73 at p. 21, para 11.
156See Davis supra note 40 at p. 250, para 1.
157See Yergin and Stoppard supra note 10 at p. 114, para 1.
158Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) (2004).
159See Jensen supra note 133 at p. 7, para 2.may act at the appropriate time. The outcome, however,
calls for further study and close examination considering
its political nature.
Along this line the ‘how’ question becomes necessary:
What mechanism is available for the Forum to inﬂuence
the market?
This question is pivotal to understanding how an
international gas market would emerge. Evidently, the
Forum can inﬂuence the market through Price, Contract,
and Fiscal Mechanisms. Generally, they may set price with
the aid of the prospective model; re-introduce destination
restriction clauses; or apply uniform ﬁscal policies. For
instance, ‘‘the desire to compare ﬁscal terms will be
irresistible’’.160 Market conditions, however, would deter-
mine their ability to act and when. Consequently, any such
action would disrupt price and create an imbalance in gas
markets, as well as, other energy markets. This portends
grave consequences considering the constraints imposed on
gas trade by Third World/OPEC radicalism, as well as,
superpower rivalries.
Geopolitical concerns, despite cost, price and LNG trade
concerns, would determine the emergence a global market
and future expansion for gas. This is particularly true
considering depleting reserves in major consuming regions
and a thriving producers-group. International cooperation
and understanding would determine the extent to which the
Forum contributes to the enhancement of gas trade
globally. The effectiveness and timeliness of any action,
however is predicated on the right market condition—
Sellers’ market. Clearly, a price-ﬁxing cartel in a compe-
titive global energy market may not enhance gas reach into
many markets (that are already competitive).
This paper does not purport to have extensively treated
all issues arising from the research questions. Rather, the
following questions are a consequence of this work: Can
the Forum exist without Russia? Is a Russian-monopoly
possible? How might the Russia-EU Energy Dialogue and
EU-OPEC Energy Dialogue affect the Forum? Would the
International Energy Forum stop the GECF from inﬂuen-
cing gas trade? How may the global energy industry handle
the concerns of developing resource-rich countries? Would
the emergence of an International gas market be advanta-
geous to the Forum?
They prompt more research and would clarify issues
further when answered.Further reading
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